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Abstract  
Quotas and affirmative policies are often implicated in debates on corporate governance. This 
paper examines critical junctures and the role of willful actors in mobilizing their ethnic and 
political positions to affect governance reform in Malaysia since independence. We trace the 
trajectory of Bumiputera affirmative policy in shaping equity ownership and composition of 
boards of directors using historical institutionalism as a lens. We find ethnic politics has been 
an endogenous force resulting in Malay share of equity ownership rising from negligible levels 
to around 20 percent and almost half of the boards of directors of listed companies 
comprising of Malays. Our analysis shows that governance is a representation, as well as a 
manifestation, of how ownership and board structures are institutionally reproduced rather 
than a mere response to global isomorphic pressures. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance; ownership; boards of directors; critical junctures; 
counterfactuals; contingencies; path dependency; Bumiputera  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines how board composition and ownership structures are constructed and 
evolve in relation to ethnic politics that shaped affirmative policies in postcolonial Malaysia. 
Focusing on affirmative policies in reforming governance, it complements recent research on 
board diversity in different countries: countries differ in their approach to promoting diversity 
in the boardroom from mandatory quota approaches (e.g. Norway and Spain) to voluntary 
approaches (e.g. UK and Australia) (See Al-Shaer & Zaman, 2016).  The Malaysian context is, 
however, different: its equity ownership and representation on boards of directors were 
historically shaped by ethnic politics and resultant affirmative policies since the country’s 
independence. Although ethnic politics in ex-colonies has been considered in 
critical/interpretive accounting research (Davie, 2005; Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005; 
Efferin & Hopper, 2007; Kim, 2008), its connection with affirmative policies and corporate 
governance has not been sufficiently explored. We try to fill this gap in the literature.  
We draw on historical institutionalism1 that explores how ideas become path-
dependent (dependent on past knowledge and trajectories) social practices under certain 
historical circumstances and political actions (see Thelen & Steinmo, 1992; Thelen, 1999; 
Campbell, 2004). In particular, we use ‘critical junctures’ which is defined as the concrete, 
temporal process that lead to incremental changes in prevailing institutions.  It is these 
temporal processes which inspire certain historic actors to take political opportunities to alter 
an institution’s path-dependent trajectory. With a particular political agenda, such actors 
become willful social actors who can both challenge and change institutions (Collier & Collier, 
1991). It is these challenges and changes which we try to bring into the fore of the discussion 
of the institutional reproduction of corporate governance.    
In Malaysia, Bumiputera2 (literally ‘sons of the soil’) developed a political agenda 
wherein willful actors addressed the issue of economic disparities between ethnic Malays and 
non-Malays. The notion of critical junctures helps us examine how this agenda was implicated 
in governance reform affecting equity ownership and representation on the boards of 
directors of Malaysian listed companies.  We thus explore three questions: (1) what critical 
junctures gave shape to postcolonial ethnic-politics and in turn affected corporate board 
composition and ownership structures? (2) how did these critical junctures become path-
dependent in reproducing board composition and ownership structures? (3) what 
counterfactuals and contingencies were present in relation to above changes? These 
questions led us to pursue a periodization analysis starting from 1957, 1970, and 1997, 
respectively. Our analysis reveals how Bumiputera’s representation on boards of directors 
                                                          
1 Historical institutionalism sits with institutional analyses which are enriched by three supplementary variants – 
namely, rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (for a review, see 
Hall & Taylor, 1996).  
2 Bumiputera has three aspects here: primarily of the people (ethnic) (i.e. the indigenous people of Malaysia); secondly, 
a policy to further the benefits or interests of Bumiputera people; and, thirdly, an institution shaping corporate 
governance (CG) in the country. Malaysia’s indigenous people comprise Malays and others termed ‘natives’ and 
‘aborigines’. Malays form a significant percentage of Bumiputera; therefore, the terms ‘Bumiputera’ and ‘Malays’ are 
used interchangeably herein. Non-Bumiputera refers to the immigrant Chinese and Indian. 
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and their share of equity ownership was increased, despite global codes and practices of 
corporate governance.  
 The contributions of our paper to the literature are twofold. First, we show that 
corporate governance practices are not simply shaped by history and political contexts (e.g. 
Campbell, 2004), but involve an institutional process that passes through critical junctures, 
path-dependencies, and underlying counterfactuals and contingencies. We show that board 
composition and ownership structures are not given attributes but rather they become 
objects for institutional flux and opportunities, allowing willful actors to preserve or change 
those attributes through advancing affirmative policies. Second, we also contribute to 
accounting and ethnicity research in less developed countries (e.g. Wickramasinghe & 
Hopper, 2005; Efferin & Hopper, 2007). This embryonic stream of research has adopted 
cultural perspectives, political economy, and historical institutionalism broadly. To 
complement this, our paper focuses on willful actors’ ethnically oriented agency roles 
implicated in how postcolonial affirmative policies are developed.  Researching corporate 
governance from this angle is important as ethnic issues are perennial in postcolonial settings 
where social and institutional transformations occurred with ethnic clashes and 
compromises.           
  This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines our perspective on governance that 
is focused on critical junctures. Section 3 describes the context researched and the methods 
employed. Section 4 provides the periodization analysis, showing how board and ownership 
structures in Malaysian corporate governance were formed and reformed through critical 
junctures. Section 5 contains the discussion and the conclusion.  
 
2. GOVERNANCE: A HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM PERSPECTIVE 
 
2.1 The point of departure  
This paper complements research examining how corporate governance affects firm 
performance and accounting and auditing quality (Sloan, 2001; Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 
2004; Davis-Friday, Eng, & Liu, 2006; Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 2007; Gul, Zhou, & Zhu, 
2013; Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Tee, Gul, Foo, & Teh, 2017). Our analysis adds to this literature 
which is often based on shareholder perspective and tends to adopt positivist methodology. 
In contrast to a reliance on quantitative data and focus on testing the statistical significance 
between variables, our paper highlights the social and political underpinnings that reveal 
institutional explanations of governance practices (Huse, 2005; Turley & Zaman, 2007; 
Tremblay & Gendron, 2011; Zaman, Hudaib, & Haniffa, 2011). For example, Sloan (2001) 
explores how organizing accounting functions through corporate governance practices 
enhances firm performance but does not consider the influence of contextual ramifications 
(see Brennan & Solomon, 2008). Our analysis of governance reform also augments research 
which adopt stakeholder perspectives (e.g. Hill & Jones, 1992; Coyle, 2007; Solomon, 2007), 
use alternative theories, and seek to broaden the scope of governance research and examine 
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implications for accountability and the wider society (see Brennan & Solomon, 2008).3 We 
add to this commendable development in the literature by adopting a historical perspective 
to explore the formation, development and underlying policy issues of governance.  
Our focus on exploring how governance ideas emerge, evolve, and change through 
institutional and social processes, and through political and historical struggles, complements 
among others, the works of Efferin and Hopper (2007), Uddin and Choudhury (2008) and 
Yonekura, Galhofer and Haslam (2012) who focus on developing country contexts. Also, while 
corporate governance reform and structures in Malaysia has been the subject of prior 
research (e.g. Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Salleh & Stewart, 2012; Fung, Gul, & Radhakrishnan, 
2015; Mat Zain, Zaman, & Mohamed, 2015; Tee et al., 2017), we add to them by drawing on 
recent advancement in the historical intuitionalism literature to unpack the processes and 
struggles affecting ownership and board structures in Malaysia. 
 
2.2 Towards critical junctures  
Attention to wider institutional context is particularly important in critical-interpretive 
research on corporate governance (Turley & Zaman, 2004). Historical institutionalism 
emphasizes how institutions emerge and become path-dependent providing knowledge and 
trajectory for social practices (Thelen, 1999). To this end, researchers have analyzed 
(comparatively) the emergence of, and processes in, different institutions (i.e. ideas, 
practices, and institutional arrangements) and interpreted institutions in terms of their trends 
in macro contexts (Hart, 1994; Hansen, Johnson, & Unah, 1995). These researchers argue that 
institutions are historical constructs that eventually become path-dependent practices: once 
the institutions have been established, people ‘blindly’ follow them, regardless of their 
efficiency and effectiveness. Hence, most historical institutionalists (e.g. Campbell, 2004) 
largely neglected how path-dependent practices change. A focus on critical junctures 
attempts to address this.      
 Critical junctures are situations involving concrete, temporal (and political) processes 
that can lead to subtle and gradual change rather than abrupt and wholesale transformation 
of institutions (Thelen, 1999; Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Soifer, 
2012). Temporal processes here consist of historically important political actions involving 
arguments and agitations against prevailing institutions and offer alternatives to those 
institutions. In studying these critical junctures, researchers pay attention to two main 
developments. First, the “change-permitting properties” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 3) in 
these temporal processes: they may be certain social and cultural forces (e.g. class, caste, 
ethnicity or religion) and contradictions with established institutions and practices (e.g. 
challenging the colonial forms of governance upon independence). For example, if a particular 
ethnic group was marginalized during colonial era (as in our case), post-independent 
movements agitate to regain its social acceptance so that ethnicity becomes a change 
                                                          
3 Theories used include stakeholder theory (Wheeler & Sillanpää, 1997), resource dependency theory (O’Connell, 
2007), institutional theory (Parker, 2007), Weber’s rationality ideas (Uddin & Choudhury, 2008), sociological and 
political theory perspectives (Sikka, Puxty, Willmott, & Cooper, 1998; Gendron & Bédard, 2006). See Wickramasinghe 
and Alwattage (2007) for a review of various theories. 
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permitting property in restructuring governance and administrative apparatuses. Although 
such change permitting properties would not materialize and subsequent changes would not 
occur immediately, political maneuvers towards such change can be organized through 
gradual social movements, sporadic events and incidents. When using “critical junctures” as 
a perspective, one can then trace these events and movements to articulate how change-
permitting possibilities are created, debated and, in turn, established, despite struggles and 
difficulties.      
The second development concerns understanding actors’ roles in such political 
movements. Actors who mobilize their political motives through the consent and support of 
large groups of people are called ‘willful actors’ (see below). This helps a ‘will-to-power’ 
develop that can affect the ‘change-permitting properties’ in a social and historical context. 
Generally, these properties are self-enforcements that drive institutional change, although 
the critical junctures literature combines this with willful actors’ agency which can foster 
change in subtle and incremental ways. That said, critical junctures seek path-dependent 
effects broadly and focus much on temporal processes and willful actors’ actions. While 
mainstream historical institutionalism explores ‘lock-in’ effects leading to taken-for-granted 
assumptions, critical junctures explore possibilities of incremental change evolving over years 
through “slow-moving causal processes” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 3). In other words, 
critical junctures look for path-dependent effects broadly while focusing much on temporal 
processes and willful actors’ actions.                
 Consequently, researchers have revisited the structure-agency debate to combine 
path-dependence arguments with critical junctures. Here, they consider path-dependence as 
a structured institution that constrains institutional change, while critical junctures prompt 
debate and change established institutions through an ‘institutional flux’ whereby willful 
actors confront alternative institutional arrangements (see Collier & Collier, 1991). Such a 
situation is ‘critical’ because various alternatives are still available for ongoing scrutiny. 
Hence, critical junctures operate through counterfactuals – ‘what if’ analyses about the 
choices not selected. These analyses are subject to political debates, (media/broadsheet) 
critiques, and resultant power struggles, and they challenge the constraints of the path-
dependent nature of historical institutions. There is often room for contingencies as well – 
those unexpected occurrences that cannot be explained ‘deterministically’ or 
‘probabilistically’. Contingencies can demand certain actions from willful actors when tackling 
issues in temporal processes. Thus, formulation of policy affecting corporate governance 
structures and practices is not always rational but is context-dependent, pragmatic and, in 
turn, variable (Flyvbjerg, 2001).   
 
2.3 Power as a supplementary instrument  
The above understanding also enables us to articulate how power - one’s ability to carry out 
his/her own will in a social relationship, despite resistance (Weber, 1978) - is linked to critical 
junctures and underlying historical analyses. As Hay and Wincott (1998) observed, in historical 
institutionalism, willful actors’ beliefs and their (political and cultural) ideologies become 
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crucial in an institution’s emergence and development. Institutions are a result of struggles 
between dominant interests and ideologies manifesting concrete actions in temporal 
processes creating politics and policies: “politics creates policies, policies also remake politics” 
(Skocpol, 1992, p. 58). Such struggles and their consequences involve both path dependence 
and critical junctures: path dependence represents constraining forces based on historical 
trajectories, traditions, and cultures, while critical junctures point to phases of institutional 
flux, as we mentioned earlier (Collier & Collier, 1991; Ertman, 1997; Katznelson, 2003).    
 Institutional flux then creates opportunities for actors to mobilize their willfulness only 
in virtue of their ‘will-to-power’. For Clegg (2006), this institutional flux is a relational space 
where history, power, and imaginations are defining principles. In other words, history is 
made - as a tradition or institution - based on will-to-power and the capacity to conceive a 
difference (imagination). How this happens in an institutional flux can be studied when 
focusing on critical junctures – those concrete, temporal processes and willful actions that 
conceive a difference because willful actors make history through powerful (ethnic-based, in 
our case) involvement. In doing so, they “imagine” and hold an ideology about a state of end 
results (in our case, Bumiputera domination).                         
 
2.4 History and governance intertwined: three interrelated propositions    
So, how do critical junctures help us understand board composition and ownership structures 
in Malaysian listed companies? In tackling this question, we follow three interrelated 
propositions as our epistemological guide: 
  
1. Agency proposition: Following actors and their willful actions in relation to historical 
phases in a postcolonial context can help one understand how actors mobilize their 
willingness to preserve and maintain certain values such as ethnicity, traditional 
cultures, and nationalistic motives. It can also assist in exploring the social and 
political realities behind taken-for-granted views on social practices such as 
corporate boards and ownership structures. Our use of critical junctures can help 
uncover how and why certain willful actors are implicated in the historical 
construction of corporate governance.  
 
2. Power proposition: Power as an ability to carry out one’s “will” is an important axis 
that hinges on actors and their actions which make history. Engagement to make 
certain ideologies overwhelmingly dominant and attractive will be possible when 
actors can imagine making a historical difference. When previous path dependencies 
can be challenged, new path dependencies can be introduced, and history can be re-
made using the power of those with political motive, or will-to-power. Previous path 
dependence can only be questioned through power relations.  
 
3. Historical proposition: In relation to 2 above, an alternative historiography becomes 
useful. As opposed to the traditional accounting historiography which emphasizes 
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the capacity to reveal the truth about the past based on verifiable historical facts, 
this alternative historiography can take the genealogists’ approach which examines 
conditions, circumstances and acts of will as well as counterfactuals and 
contingencies to show how history is made into a strange present (Richardson, 2008).  
 
3. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 Data 
As has already been mentioned, we explore corporate governance as a politically constructed 
practice that has experienced much debate during its evolution on diverse issues, ranging 
from how initial conditions developed into path dependence, through the critical junctures of 
institutional flux, and to self-reinforcements for institutional reproduction or change. To 
explore the historical process in this manner, as many accounting historians do (see 
Richardson, 2008), we collect data largely from archives such as legislative publications, 
monographs, and local articles. We use this data to trace events that were possibly politically 
and socially critical in the evolution of Malaysian corporate governance practices from pre-
independence to recent times. We also use material from the public domain, such as speeches 
by politicians and books by influential figures. Furthermore, we rely on government websites, 
press releases, government officials’ speeches, and international organizations’ reports.  
When a mountain of materials accumulated, we revisited historical institutionalism 
which inspired us to reconcile the periodization analysis with critical junctures. This allowed 
us to re-read and analyze the materials to better understand how concrete, temporal 
processes inform certain periods in history from the late 1950s (see below). This process led 
us to provide evidence on how critical junctures came about, how certain willful actors were 
involved in each of the events, and how contingencies and counterfactuals were implicated 
in the making and re-making of historical phases.  
 
3.2 Analysis  
Our periodization analysis identified three historical phases that created critical junctures for 
willful actors to exploit opportunities for establishing the Bumiputera institution. This 
preliminary analysis enabled us to produce our historical narrative (Fairclough 2003; Leitch & 
Palmer, 2010) of how the trajectory of Bumiputera institution influenced governance 
practices. Throughout this narrative, we focus on events and incidents in critical junctures to 
trace how equity ownership and board structures in listed companies, including Government-
Linked Companies (GLCs), developed since independence in 1957. The narrative developed 
through detailed reflections on secondary sources and writing and re-writing processes to 
position the data within the theoretical framework (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006). The resultant 
narrative illustrates how critical junctures provide not only a way of understanding board 
representation and ownership structures but also an alternate historiography that shows how 
history is discursively made (Richardson, 2008).     
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4. FINDINGS AND NARRATIVES 
We have identified three historical phases (see Figure 1)4: (i) the country’s independence in 
1957; (ii) the New Economic Policy (NEP) launched in 1970; and (iii) the 1997/98 Asian 
economic crisis. Although this periodization may also represent a structural evolution in the 
Malaysian socio-economic and political landscape, we use “critical junctures” which helps us 
to understand how Bumiputera affected the reform of corporate governance in Malaysia. In 
Figure 1, the left-hand side panel represents these critical junctures while the right-hand side 
panel shows Bumiputera mechanisms and their effects on corporate governance. Inferences 
about Bumiputera‘s impact on ownership are made via the progress towards target 
percentage of equity ownership as stated in the affirmative policy of Bumiputera.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
4.1 Phase 1: Willful actors - in the making of Bumiputera institution  
As discussed earlier in Section 2, critical junctures create opportunities for willful actors to 
alter trajectories – in our case, that of corporate governance in postcolonial Malaysia. These 
actors are willful because they hold an agenda inspired by a political (and cultural) ideology 
and because they are engaged in continuous politics and struggles to achieve this agenda. 
Their engagement gave rise to ‘will-to-power’ for challenging the political ideology 
underpinning the existing colonial institutions that had played a path-dependent role 
(Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Willful actors’ roles became historic because they exercised their 
will-to-power in an institutional flux towards ‘change-permitting’ temporal processes – in 
other words, critical junctures (Thelen, 2004). This section shows how the Bumiputera 
institution emerged through a temporal process wherein willful actor debated, propagated, 
and, in turn, sustained this institution, despite certain counterfactuals and contingencies.  
Bumiputera institution emerged representing both an outcome of a temporal process 
through historical junctures and a series of means to such outcomes. The temporal process 
goes back to pre-independent Malaysia (then Malaya), when opportunities emerged for 
willful actors to do some ‘historical work’. Two related critical junctures are central here: (1) 
the rejection of the British idea of the Malayan Union in the post-World War 2 period; and (2) 
Britain’s declaration of the country’s independence in 1957 and the subsequent promulgation 
of a new constitution (see below). These critical junctures are interrelated as native Malays 
opposed the union idea while the declaration of independence provided an opportunity for 
them to pursue their opposition.  
Malay opposition was linked to a gradual shift in power structure. The prevalent 
governance structure for centuries was the rule of the Sultans.5 Since colonization, the power 
                                                          
4 Most researchers in the social sciences followed this method of periodization analysis in numerous comparative 
historical analyses (Lieberman, 2001; Perusek, 2002). 
5 Malaysia is now a constitutional monarchy and the Head of the State (Yang di-Pertuan) is elected, from among 
themselves, by the nine Sultans (hereditary rulers). As observed in the Economist (February 3rd, 2017, How powerful 
are Malaysia’s Sultans’), “Although more than 40 countries retain a monarch of some sort, Malaysia’s system is probably 
the world’s oddest. The country has nine sultans, who as well as reigning ceremonially in their own states take it in 
turns to serve five-year terms as Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the head of state of the entire country. The sultans meet three 
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of Sultans declined as the British established new administrative structures to run the state. 
Later, the Sultans had to obtain advice from the British and to act accordingly on all matters 
except those concerning Malay religion and customs (Yong, 2004). The Malays’ political power 
was further weakened when the British introduced a migration policy in late 18th century that 
allowed many Chinese and Indian workers to enter the country.6 By 1921, the number of 
migrants almost equaled the Malay population and some policies disadvantaged the Malays 
both politically and economically.7 Such developments led Malays to agitate politically. In 
response, the British recognized the Malays as the country’s original people, but this was not 
deemed favorable enough (Horii, 1991)8 because elite Chinese capitalists enjoyed economic 
prosperity while Malays had limited opportunities in both social and economic spheres (Yong, 
2004).  
 However, a critical juncture transpired during World War 2 when the Japanese briefly 
occupied Malaya until August 1945. British return to power in September 1945 brought a 
proposal for a Malayan Union. At that time, Malaya comprised nine legally sovereign states, 
and the Malayan Union scheme proposed amalgamating them (except Singapore) into a 
unitary state and to guarantee equal rights for everyone, including Chinese and Indian 
immigrants. However, Malay people resisted and in 1948 the Federation of Malaya 
Agreement was signed by Malay Sultans and the British government. This Agreement became 
a critical juncture – a historical moment that restored Malays’ special position.9 It has 
implications for path dependence which are important for our analysis. We discuss these 
below.  
 
4.1.1 An initial temporal act on critical juncture: Rejection of Malayan Union 
The Union proposal contained three radical provisions (Horii, 1991): (1) abolishing the Malay 
Sultanate system; (2) ensuring equal rights (of political and cultural participation) for the 
whole population; and (3) granting citizenship to all permanent residents. Resistance to this 
came from Malays’ belief that the Sultans were forced into accepting the Malayan Union, the 
Sultans would lose their political power and become mere social and religious leaders, and 
                                                          
times a year and are considered guardians of the culture and religion of the ethnic-Malay majority, though they have 
little formal authority.”  
6 The influx of Chinese and Indian immigrants had increased the population of Malaya from 550,000 in 1850 to about 
2.4 million in 1911. In 1931, the combination of 1.6 million Chinese and 0.6 million Indians had already exceeded the 
Malay population of just under 2.0 million (Khoo, 2005). In 2017 the population in Malaysia is estimated at 32.0 million: 
28.7 million are citizens and 3.3 million are non-citizens. The 28.7 million Malaysian citizens consist of 68.8% 
Bumiputera, 23.2% Chinese, 7% Indians, and 1% others (Mahidin, 2017). 
7 These include the British ‘divide and rule’ policy which separated the Malays from the immigrant communities 
physically and disadvantaged the former economically (Jesudason, 1989). 
8 For example, the British introduced the Rice Land Act to protect Malays’ land. However, this prohibited Malay peasant 
from cultivating any crop other than rice on Reserve land, which prevented them from engaging in modern economic 
activities (Lim, 1985). 
9 The phrase "a historical moment that restored Malays' special position" refers to the fact that the signing of Federation 
of Malaya Agreement (after the dismantling of Malayan Union) restored Malays’ special position in the country as the 
original people of Malaya. They enjoyed this special position during British colony as the British had recognised them 
as the original people of Malaya, while Chinese and Indians were recognised as immigrants. However, under Malayan 
Union scheme, all ethnicities / populations were considered equal (Chinese and Indian were eligible for citizenship of 
Malaya). Hence, when the Federation of Malaya Agreement was signed in 1948, the Sultanate system was restored and 
Malays enjoyed their special status, as Bumiputera again. 
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granting citizenship to immigrants would jeopardize Malays’ special position in society. In 
short, Malays alleged that the proposal threatened their identity (Sopiee, 2005).  
A key willful actor in this resistance was Dato’ Onn Jaafar, a well-known elite (but not 
Royal) with an English education, who promoted unity among the Malays and influenced the 
Sultans to reject the Malayan Union proposal. Consequently, seven members of the Malayan 
Union Advisory Council refused to serve in the legislature and Onn founded the United Malays 
National Organization (hereafter UMNO) to represent all Malays (Sopiee, 2005). Despite the 
resistance, the Malayan Union was inaugurated on April 1, 1946, but on May 11 UMNO was 
reconstituted with Onn elected, with the backing of the Sultans, as its first president. The 
Malay nationalists acted in concert with the Old Malayans10 and the Rulers. This coupled with 
increased opposition to British policy from British officials in Malaya meant the Malayan 
Union survived only for less than two years. It was dismantled in February 1948 and the British 
signed the Federation of Malaya Agreement with the Sultans and the UMNO. The willful 
actor’s role was thus historically significant in this critical juncture.  
 The phase of rejecting the Malayan Union involved heightened contingencies for 
Malay states. The British had the option to either continue with the Malayan Union scheme 
or to submit to Malay demands. The former would significantly diminish the Malays’ political 
power; also, equal citizenship would remove Malays’ special positions in the states. A 
plausible consequence was continued resistance from the Malays and withdrawal of their 
support. As the British relied on Malays to oversee rural areas, Malay opposition would 
jeopardize British control there. Thus, under these contingent circumstances, the British 
abolished the Malayan Union and signed the Federation of Malaya Agreement and 
transferred political power to the Malays. More political power later enabled the Malays to 
implement policies to pursue their economic interests and affect corporate governance 
reforms.  
 
4.1.2 A Revitalization of Critical Junctures: Effect of independence on governance   
Independence in 1957 became another critical juncture for the emergence and development 
of the Bumiputera institution and subsequent effects on governance structures. 
Independence marked the handing of political power to the then National Coalition 
(Alliance)11 and also the successful negotiation by UMNO to preserve Bumiputera interests. 
The Alliance made a series of important deals, or a social contract: bargaining between the 
Malays and non-Malays to preserve the Malays as the states’ original people and granting 
citizenship to Chinese and Indian immigrants (Thomas, 2007). Consequently, the immigrants 
accepted the Bumiputera‘s special position and in exchange the Malays guaranteed 
citizenship for non-Malays and secured their economic interests. This social contract was later 
reflected and reinforced in the 1957 Constitution of Malaya.  
                                                          
10 The Old Malayans are the Malay people who resided in Great Britain during that period. 
11 An alliance established between three political ethnic-based parties representing their respective ethnicity: UMNO – 
representing the Malays (headed the alliance); the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) – representing the Chinese; 
and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) – representing the Indians. 
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 Although political power was transferred to the Alliance, the UMNO remained 
dominant and pursued Bumiputera‘s economic interests and sought means to increase their 
representation on boards of directors and share of equity ownership. The critical juncture of 
independence therefore secured Bumiputera’s special constitutional rights and the Malays’ 
power, i.e. both independence and the constitution placed Bumiputera’s ‘institutional 
arrangements’ for many path dependencies, therefore marking a starting point for the 
exercise of Malay political power and pursuit of interests.  
The critical juncture embedded in independence evidently changed the governance 
landscape by guaranteeing the Malays’ representation on corporate boards. In other words, 
independence became a ‘change-permitting property’ that put Malays on corporate boards 
despite their limited investment and experience (Mohamad, 1970). This development led to 
more ‘will-to-power’ for the Malays: they developed close relationships with Chinese 
businesses; the Malayanization of British business interests followed; and Malayan 
investment and trading companies emerged (ibid). However, the Malays’ involvement in the 
economy remained minimal. In 1969, their equity ownership stood at only 1.5% (see Figure 
2), which also reflects their ownership of other assets such as land and buildings (EPU – 
Economic Planning Unit, 1971, pp. 39–41). Also, their representation on corporate boards of 
directors was not significant (see Figure 3a) and foreigners continued to monopolize the 
economy and hence foreign directors dominated boards. Nevertheless, Bumiputera 
representation appears significant when contrasted with their shareholdings. For example, in 
1969, about 10% of directors in pioneer companies12 were Malays although the appointments 
were confined to a few influential Malays, e.g. 60% were former bureaucrats and/or 
politicians (Lindenberg, 1973, cited by Lim, 1985).  
   
[Insert Figures 2, 3a, 3b and 3c about here] 
 
4.1.3 Contingencies and counterfactuals 
We find that it was the ethnic orientation of post-independent Malaysian politics that, 
through the Bumiputera institution, infused an ideological rationality into board 
representation and ownership structure. While the rejection of the Malayan Union in 1946 
and independence in 1957 materialized critical junctures, this ethnic orientation triggered 
multiple political powers for the Malays. Accepting the Malayan Union would not have given 
the Bumiputera any special rights or privileges because this involved establishing equal 
citizenship. Independence came through the Federation of Malaya Agreement, which inspired 
Malays to pursue social prominence. The Malayan constitution protects this privilege; hence, 
these contingencies were subtle reactions from Malays through which they secured some 
notable powers compared with the Chinese in Malaysia.  
                                                          
12 Pioneer status may be granted to the companies participating in promoted activity or producing a promoted product. 
The power to determine any product or activity lies with the Minister of International Trade and Industry. The list 
includes manufacturing, agricultural, hotel and tourism sectors. 
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Moreover, willful actors carefully thought of counterfactuals (‘what if’ analyses) to 
address unintended consequences. For example, rejecting the Malayan Union not only 
prevented the transfer of ceremonial political power from the Sultans to the British but also 
strengthened the Sultans’ position and – through their newly formed political engine, UMNO 
– Malays’ political power. Rejecting the Malayan Union, the declaration of independence of 
Malaya, and the country’s constitution yielded the path-dependent Bumiputera institution, 
which later affected Malays’ representation on corporate boards of directors and share of 
equity ownership. 
 
4.2 Phase 2: Power as an additional mechanism  
The neglect of Bumiputera’s economic interest gave rise to another critical juncture. The 
neglect came from the institution’s embryonic form and underlying political struggles not 
being strong enough to organize interests that brought sufficient power to influence 
Bumiputera representation on corporate boards of directors and share of equity ownership. 
Hence, as Phase 1 suggests, institutional building was incomplete. Phase 2, however, 
significantly influenced Bumiputera ownership and board representation, and the institution 
developed in certain ways. This section discusses how it happened.  
 
4.2.1 Post-Independence – Economy without Intervention 
Post-independent Malaysia contained ethnic, religious, and language divisions. The economy 
was largely controlled by foreigners.13 Although the constitution spelled out Bumiputera’s 
special position, including preferential treatment regarding government roles, access to 
educational scholarships, and the allocation of business licenses, it made little difference to 
the Bumiputera people. Malays still found it difficult to prosper economically: in 1970 64.8% 
of Malay households lived below the poverty line compared with 26.0% of Chinese and 39.2% 
of Indian households (EPU, 1976, p. 180). UMNO’s political power was still weak as the prime 
minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was reluctant to favor Bumiputera lest it jeopardized Chinese 
economic interest.  
As White (2004a) notes, like many Alliance leaders, Tunku Abdul Rahman came from 
a privileged class and promoted the multi-racial, free-enterprise, and pro-British vision of 
governance. The Alliance was considered heirs of the colonial rulers while British companies 
dominated the economy. Although UMNO leaders were in the cabinet, its influence was 
limited: it depended on the MCA which had significant influence in government circles. MCA 
mitigated the efforts of younger Malay leaders who threatened MCA’s interests. 
Consequently, as White (2004b, p. 393) notes, despite UMNO’s commitment to advancing the 
kampung (Malay villagers), no scheme was introduced that increased Malays’ share of the 
economy. Meanwhile, MCA’s political power helped prevent excessive bureaucratic 
interference in private businesses.  
                                                          
13 Foreign presence was most pronounced in the manufacturing sector where, in 1970, it controlled almost 60% of 
capital in manufacturing (Jesudason, 1989, p. 60). 
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Nevertheless, the importance of the Bumiputera’s economic interest was made 
explicit by certain young Malay nationalists within UMNO who championed the Malay case. 
By the mid-1960s, Malay businessmen started to pressure the government through their 
connections with political and administrative elites. The First (1965) and Second (1968) 
Bumiputera Economic Congress were crucial here.14 As Khoo (1987, p. 112) notes, a delegate 
said: “If the Malays have no stake in this country . . . [it] is certain that the non-Malays will 
find it difficult to carry on their economic activities in peace and security.” Quoting from the 
first Congress, Lim (1985, p. 260) also notes: “If Bumiputeras do not own their companies or 
do not share the ownership of Malaysian companies, then this policy is a failure.” Both 
congresses highlighted Malays’ unhappiness with their lack of representation on corporate 
boards, which was particularly criticized in the second Bumiputera Economic Congress (Lim, 
1985). Several proposals were thus developed which included: (i) giving training opportunities 
to develop Bumiputera expertise; (ii) strategizing Bumiputera expansion in the economy; (iii) 
solving the problems of Bumiputera businesses; and (iv) ensuring pioneering companies 
reserve at least 10% of ownership for Bumiputera (Jesudason, 1989). These efforts did not 
significantly affect governance structures, especially board representation and equity 
ownership, because while young Malay nationalists promoted the Bumiputera institution 
UMNO elite leaders were focused on country’s economic stability (Khoo, 1987). The young 
Malay nationalists had insufficient power to affect institutional change. The ethnic clash that 
occurred on May 13, 1969 was, however, a critical juncture that ushered in significant change. 
 
4.2.2 The May 13, 1969 ethnic clash: another critical juncture  
In May 1969, perceived economic disparities caused an ethnic clash between Malays and the 
Chinese after the country’s general election which gave Chinese candidates from the 
opposition party significant parliamentary power (Reid, 1969). Several important events 
followed. First, a state of emergency was declared and parliamentary democracy was 
suspended for about 21 months. Second, a new Malay-dominated National Operations 
Council was created to coordinate executive actions under the leadership of the then deputy 
prime minister, Tun Abdul Razak, because the prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, had lost 
credibility with the Malays (Jesudason, 1989). With the formation of National Operations 
Council, Tunku was sidelined and gradually lost political power while Tun Abdul Razak had 
“virtually unlimited power to rule by decree” (Funston, 1980, p. 212). Several important 
political figures emerged, including Mahathir Mohamad who proposed the politico-economic 
solution of “constructive protection”15 (Mohamad, 1970, p. 31). He deemed racial equality a 
prerequisite for racial harmony and national unity. Pressures also mounted as the young 
group of Malay leaders outside the cabinet proposed recommendations for the new cabinet, 
                                                          
14 The congresses’ objectives were to generate interest among the Bumiputera to participate in commerce and industry 
– by providing facilities for training those interested in the two fields – and to find ways and means of securing those 
objectives. 
15 This refers to the state’s interventionist positive discrimination (or affirmative actions) in favour of Bumiputera. This 
is embodied in the NEP that aimed to restructure wealth in the country, particularly through creating Bumiputera 
business community and achieving 30% share of equity ownership for the Bumiputera. 
 V-2017-11-23 CG BUMI Page 14 of 40 
  
including depriving the MCA of their Finance, and Commerce and Industry portfolios which 
since independence were under the power of the MCA president. The prime minister resigned 
in 1970 and in January 1971 parliamentary government resumed and the new government 
launched the NEP. 
 The ethnic clash formed a critical juncture in the Bumiputera institution’s 
development as the UMNO elites’ ideological influence on political actions was significantly 
reduced and the younger Malay nationalists took effective control of the government. From 
this critical juncture, the range of plausible choices open to powerful actors, especially the 
young Malay nationalists, expanded substantially and their decisions concerning the 
Bumiputera institution affected future developments. The crisis manifested the ideological 
clash between the young nationalists within UMNO and the Malay elite leaders (Mohamad, 
2008). In short, the incident had a significant political impact on the country: it helped reduce 
the influence of older UMNO leaders, who had favored the Chinese, and enabled the younger 
Malay leaders supporting the Malays’ prominence.  
 In this critical juncture, the younger leaders took the opportunity to devise policies 
aimed at improving the Malays’ economic condition and to present a pro-Malay NEP. From 
our historical institutional perspective, this structured a political struggle into a policy 
outcome within which the willful actors organized their interests and created a decision-
making situation for a particular group of actors to exercise certain powers. The actors’ 
willfulness developed the power position that emerged from this historically significant 
circumstance which we understand as a concrete temporal process.      
 
4.2.3 Development of NEP – the role of power 
A counterfactual analysis of the new economic policy’s introduction shows that the NEP 
resulted from a clash of interests and power between the country’s two major groups. This is 
because the NEP was drafted by two competing departments pushing different ideas to 
protect their group’s interests: the Economic Planning Unit established in 1961 and headed 
by a Chinese official and staffed by several Chinese economists and which formulated the 
country’s economic policy since independence represented the interests of the economically 
dominant non-Bumiputera, and the Department of National Unity set up on July 1, 1969 
following the ethnic clash representing Bumiputera interests (Heng, 1997).16  
 The policy the Economic Planning Unit pursued was inherited from the colonial 
system. Its conservative approach emphasized a balanced budget, growth first and 
distribution later, more effective policy and strategy implementation, and maintaining 
political stability with minimum government involvement in economic affairs. It deemed the 
May 1969 riots an unfortunate event that should not affect economic policy formulation. The 
newly established Department of National Unity, however, viewed the riots as manifestation 
of a structural defect in the country’s political economy which required measures to tackle 
economic imbalances between the ethnic groups, especially as these imbalances affected 
                                                          
16 The UMNO elites’ pro-Chinese approach meant the Chinese controlled the country’s important economic portfolios, 
including the Ministry of Finance, which appointed the Governor of Bank Negara (Malaysian Central Bank). 
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ethnic integration, national unity, and social stability. They put forward a radical alternative 
in the NEP which sought to advance Bumiputera interests and specified targets for 
Bumiputera participation in the economy. 
 The Economic Policy Unit’s proposals received support from the Finance Minister who 
was also president of the MCA and deemed a very respectable and powerful politician: 
“without his approval no policy could be adopted” (Faaland, Parkinson, & Saniman, 1990, p. 
30). Consequently, the Department of National Unity’s proposals were accepted as the first 
draft of the NEP. The Economic Committee of the National Consultative Council was 
established by the government, comprising representatives from various groups to deliberate 
on the draft. However, the Council’s deliberations were not publicized; rationalization of the 
ideas only occurred at the higher level. Given the sensitive nature of this issue, policy 
deliberations were kept out of the media to allow thorough discussion and a consensus that 
benefited all Malaysians (ibid).  
 The MCA had minimal input into the NEP. The ethnic clash weakened the Chinese at 
both social and political levels. However, the MCA president still managed to use his office of 
Minister of Finance to delay the policy’s implementation (Heng, 1997). The NEP was only 
properly implemented after the MCA president resigned from his position in 1974, but the 
final policy was considered moderate for several reasons. First, ethnic leaders were focused 
on high-level co-operation which enabled compromise. Secondly, policy differences between 
the Department of National Unity and the Economic Policy Unit resulted in compromises in 
policy-making. Thirdly, the Chinese community had some electoral support (Geoffrey & 
Stafford, 1997). The NEP thus encompassed an explicit commitment to the Bumiputera 
people.17 Following its establishment, the state made various efforts to achieve the policy’s 
objectives. The following section discusses these efforts affecting Bumiputera representation 
on corporate boards of directors and their share of equity ownership.  
 
4.2.4 Impact on corporate governance  
In pursuit of Bumiputera interest the NEP set targets for equity ownership: 30:40:30 for 
Bumiputera, non-Bumiputera and foreign investors, respectively. In the NEP’s early years, the 
government established and strengthened various mechanisms to benefit the Bumiputera 
and passed the Industrial Coordination Act of 1975. Through the various newly formed 
bodies18 the government acquired equity ownership from foreign shareholders and started 
forming state-owned-enterprises. The government also introduced the Foreign Investment 
Committee in 1974 to achieve the NEP’s objective of 30% Bumiputera equity ownership.19  
                                                          
17 The NEP had two general aims: poverty eradication regardless of race and restructuring society to eliminate the 
identification of race with the economic function. 
18 The bodies include the investment holding company, the “Perbadanan Nasional Berhad” (National Trading 
Corporation or PERNAS), established in 1969; establishing the “Yayasan Pelaburan Bumiputera” (Bumiputera 
Investment Foundation) and its investment company, “Permodalan Nasional Berhad” (National Equity Corporation or 
PNB) in 1978. 
19 This led to the Guidelines on Acquisition of Assets, Mergers and Take-Overs being established in 1974 which 
regulated matters on foreign investment and imposed specific conditions on firms seeking a listing in Malaysia, 
including the 30% Bumiputera equity participation requirement. The 1974 Guidelines were updated in 2004 and 
subsequently repealed in 2009 as the country entered a neoliberal era.  
 V-2017-11-23 CG BUMI Page 16 of 40 
  
 In the early 1980s, in response to a slowing economy, the government liberalized its 
policy to promote growth and pursued a privatization policy for national development and to 
promote Bumiputera participation in the corporate sector. Although in 1990 the NEP officially 
ended, the policy of advancing Bumiputera interests continued. In the Sixth Malaysian Plan 
1990–1995, the government announced the Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial 
Community (BCIC) to create competitive and resilient small-and-medium scale Bumiputera 
enterprises in strategic sectors and introduced the Bumiputera Joint-Venture Scheme to 
achieve the 30% equity target for Bumiputera.20 
 The government’s efforts and economic expansion resulted in a steady increase in 
Bumiputera equity ownership during 1970 to 1985. Non-Bumiputera equity also increased 
while foreign ownership continued to decline (see Figure 2). In fact, in 1980 non-Bumiputera 
share ownership reached 40% with a significant increase in individual Bumiputera equity 
ownership and in holding of trust agencies. Bumiputera equity ownership was also affected 
through PERNAS which over time acquired shares owned by foreigners and held them in trust 
(Geoffrey & Stafford, 1997). There was also growth of state-owned enterprises providing 
employment opportunities for the Bumiputera (Haggard & Low, 2000).  
 Bumiputera representation on corporate boards of directors started to increase with 
the formation of the NEP although foreign directors dominated boards (see Figure 3a). In the 
early years of the Policy Malay directors were not involved in managing business but were 
‘functional directors’ who performed extra-economic functions for the corporation and 
sometimes symbolically represented the Bumiputera (Lim, 1981). Their presence was 
politically significant for securing contracts, tenders, licenses, and concessions from the state. 
Prominent Malay politicians or former civil servants were needed on the boards because the 
government was a major client and there was an increase in government regulation of the 
private sector (Lim, 1985). In 1974 for example, compared with about 7% Chinese, 50% of 
Malay directors were politicians or civil servants (Lim, 1981). Also, more than 50% of Malay 
directors held a state-conferred title compared with only 15% of Chinese directors.21 In 
contrast to more than 70% of Chinese directors only 35% of Malay directors had a business 
background. Having influential directors on boards helped companies exert influence over the 
government in shaping economic policies (Lim, 1981). Additionally, Bumiputera 
representation on corporate boards helped them become familiar with business affairs, and 
mitigate their marginalization in employment (Mohamad, 1970). 
 The mid-1980s privatization policy also significantly influenced share ownership as 
Bumiputera  ownership increased to 18.5% and non-Bumiputera reached 50%, while foreign 
ownership fell to its lowest at 24%. The privatization policy also marked the emergence of 
GLCs 22, whose board members were mainly Malay, to further Bumiputera interests. In 1990, 
                                                          
20 The BCIC is a consortium of commercial banks to finance the establishment of joint-ventures between Bumiputera 
and non-Bumiputera entrepreneurs.  
21 This refers to the title obtained through a knighthood conferred by Sultans or the state. 
22 GLCs are defined as companies that have a primary commercial objective and are under the control of a Government-
Linked Investment Companies (GLICs). A GLIC has control over GLC when it is the majority shareholder or single largest 
shareholder and when it has the ability to exercise and influence major decisions such as appointment of board 
members and senior management, award of tenders and contracts and so on. GLICs are defined as Federal Government-
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Bumiputera share of equity ownership stood at 19.3% far below the 30% target and foreign 
ownership started to surge because, besides privatization, the liberalization strategy after 
1985, when foreign ownership was at its lowest level, meant the government promoted 
inflows of foreign investment to boost export-oriented industrialization (Fukunaga, 2010). In 
contrast non-Bumiputera equity peaked in 1985 and then started to decline.  
 In terms of breakdown of Bumiputera equity ownership, Bumiputera individuals 
accounted for only slightly more than a third of total Bumiputera equity in 1980, but their 
ownership grew at a faster rate of 32% per annum.23  By 1985, Bumiputera individuals 
accounted for more than the share of trust agencies (EPU, 1986, p. 106). Between 1990 and 
1995, trust agencies’ share of ownership reduced because of privatization and the sale of 
some trust agencies’ holdings to Bumiputera individuals and GLCs. During this period, there 
was a focus on changing the control of corporates with Bumiputera individuals or groups 
“taking the corporate scene by storm”:  Bumiputera companies started taking over Chinese 
businesses and there was a growing trend of Bumiputera-Chinese business partnerships 
(Cheong, 1993, p. 363).24  
 Increased Bumiputera interest in public listed companies also increased the number 
of Malay directors and they started to dominate the boards of directors. The number of 
Bumiputera owner-directors in public listed companies also increased. Phase 2, therefore, 
shows that the Bumiputera institution altered the power structure within the country by 
strengthening the previously subordinate actors of young Malay nationalists at the expense 
of the previously dominant ones from UMNO and the MCA (Mahoney, 2000). The advantaged 
group of young Malays used their additional power to expand the Bumiputera institution 
further, primarily by establishing the NEP. This expansion increased the UMNO leaders’ power 
and strengthened the institution thereby affecting Bumiputera equity ownership and 
representation on corporate boards of directors. 
 
4.3 Phase 3: The critical juncture reproducing Bumiputera  
While Phase 1 and Phase 2 show equity ownership and corporate board representations 
evolved through the Bumiputera institution, Phase 3 shows how this critical juncture affected 
the Bumiputera institution and thereby also directly affected governance reforms and 
structures as the country sought to respond to international concerns about governance in 
the region. The Asian crisis opened various contingencies regarding the Bumiputera 
institution’s development and had implications for Bumiputera’s stake in the economy, 
including their share of corporate equity ownership. Nevertheless, despite various pressures 
the Bumiputera institution persists, as the analysis below will show, demonstrating how 
power helped reproduce the Bumiputera institution following the critical juncture. Although 
                                                          
Linked Investment Companies that allocate some or all of their funds to GLC investments. Their board members and 
senior management report directly to the Government (PCG - Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance, 2015). 
23 Individuals include contributions made by private Bumiputera enterprises, the National Unit Trust Scheme, and the 
PNB. 
24 In 1993, 48 public companies were under the control of Bumiputera individuals and companies, and 26 companies 
were under the control of GLCs. 
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the 30% Bumiputera equity requirement developed in Phase 2 was removed during Phase 3, 
commitment to the Bumiputera institution remained. The Bumiputera institution was 
reproduced through support from an elite group of actors (i.e. UMNO). This echoes how “an 
institution can persist even when most individuals or groups prefer to change it, provided that 
an elite that benefits from the existing arrangement has sufficient strength to promote its 
reproduction” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 521).  
 This critical juncture brought governance to the fore and to the publication of the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) in March 2000. Because of the global 
proliferation of neoliberal agenda and its impact on corporate governance practices (see 
Harvey, 2005; Morales, Gendron, & Guénin-Paracini, 2014; Chiapello, 2017), the Code 
reinforced the country’s acceptance of global best practices in governance. However, there is 
a paradox. As we see below, ethnicity is still implicated in board representation and corporate 
ownership structures due to Bumiputera influence. Although the Asian crisis resulted in the 
adoption of mechanisms to strengthen governance practices, it also prompted another critical 
juncture which threatened Bumiputera institution’s path dependence and raised questions 
regarding the fairness of targets for corporate equity ownership and representation on 
boards of directors. Also, while the governance code signals adoption of neoliberal policies 
intended to attract international investment, the government’s commitment to pursue 
Bumiputera interest remains powerful. 
 
4.3.1 Another critical juncture – The Asian crisis and the New Economic Model 
The 1997/98 Asian crisis raised international criticisms about political practices, economic 
structures and governance in the region (Corsetti, 1998). Malaysia was compelled to adopt 
immediate measures aimed at improving corporate governance.25 Also, as the country was 
becoming less competitive in attracting foreign investment, economic reform was deemed 
urgent and thus the government pursued neoliberal economic policies. As we see below, this 
was not uncommon in many non-western countries as neoliberalism has challenged almost 
all prevailing institutions and practices (Hopper, Lassou, & Soobaroyen, 2017).  Consequently, 
the Bumiputera policy was put on the back burner, threatening the Bumiputera institution’s 
path dependence. In 2009, the new prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi announced 
further liberalization efforts and removed the 30% Bumiputera equity quota which had 
defined the country’s political system for 37 years.26  
 Another important development occurred soon afterwards when, in March 2010, the 
government released the New Economic Model (NEM) developed by the National Economic 
Advisory Council whose panel included high-profile figures, both local and foreign, such as an 
                                                          
25 Malaysian corporate governance was argued to be better (at least on paper) than that of the other four worst-hit 
countries (Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, and Korea), as the country initiated measures to strengthen and modernize 
its regulatory framework for the corporate sector and capital market well before the Asian crisis. The only major 
problem was deemed to be poor compliance and enforcement (Capulong, Edwards, Webb, & Zhuang, 2000). 
26 The Foreign Investment Committee Guidelines that covered the acquisition of equity shares, mergers, and takeovers 
was also repealed, and Foreign Investment Committee will no longer process any share transaction nor impose equity 
conditions guidelines. In short, the 30% Bumiputera equity condition the Foreign Investment Committee imposed was 
removed because it had failed to achieve its objectives. 
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ex-minister, a prominent economist, academic and corporate advisors, and World Bank 
representatives. The NEM aimed to take Malaysia out of the middle-income trap and make it 
a high-income country. Significantly, it espoused ‘inclusive growth’ which represented a 
radical shift and meant affirmative actions would no longer focus solely on Bumiputera but 
rather seek to treat all ethnic groups falling in specified income threshold fairly and equally. 
In promoting ‘inclusive growth’, the NEM report (National Economic Advisory Council, 2009, 
p. 4) observes: 
 
Policies and strategies we used to achieve the current state of development are now 
inadequate to take us to the next stage [. . . .]  The government must confront these 
realities and make tough decisions. We urgently need a radical change in our approach 
to economic development which will be sustainable over the long term, will reach 
everyone in the country and will enable Malaysia to reach high-income status.  
 
The NEM report noted that the practice of ethnic quotas, which was imposed extensively 
throughout the economy, yielded unhealthy and pervasive rent-seeking and patronage 
activities that overshadowed and irreparably harmed key affirmative action programs. It 
asserted: “All stakeholders are demanding that these practices be revamped and changed to 
make them more effective, equitable, and inclusive.” (p. 92). The report caused uproar among 
some Malay rights groups for its lack of regard for the Bumiputera (The Star, 2010). 
Recognizing the adverse implications for Bumiputera’s interests, Malay non-governmental 
organizations established a council called the Malay Consultative Council to oppose the 
document. Two groups of dominant actors were thus formed: the National Economic Advisory 
Council and its supporters favoring the removal of Bumiputera affirmative policy and the 
Malay Consultative Council who opposed it.  
 The counterfactual analysis, in the following section, shows how this Malay group was 
able to exert pressure on the government to recommit to the pursuit of Bumiputera interests. 
Given the economic situation the country was facing and that the NEM was drawn up by the 
Council, which included local and foreign economic experts, the Model should have prevailed. 
However, the Malay Consultative Council’s resistance and its utilization of political power 
resulted in softening of the position taken. The following section discusses the Malay 
Consultative Council’s and the Chinese reaction to the NEM document and the government’s 
response to the struggles. 
 
4.3.2 Struggles against and in support of the NEM 
The Malay Consultative Council has been a noteworthy influence on government policy 
towards Bumiputera. Formed by 76 Malay non-governmental organizations in February 2010, 
and headed by an independent minister of parliament Ibrahim Ali, it sought to defend and 
protect Bumiputera rights and interests, especially to safeguard Malay rights contained in 
Article 153 of the Constitution. On May 29, 2010, it convened the Bumiputera Economic 
Congress to respond to the first part of the NEM document and pressured the government 
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into reconsidering the intention to remove the Bumiputera policy. Following the congress, the 
Tenth Malaysian Plan 2011-2015 containing explicit measures to promote Bumiputera 
interests was released.  
 While the Malay Consultative Council strongly opposed the NEM, in contrast the 
Chinese community supported it. In August 2010, the MCA organized a similar congress, the 
Chinese Economic Congress, which pledged support for the Model and for the removal of 
Bumiputera’s special position. In the resolutions adopted, it cites the impact of policies on 
corporate governance in Malaysia (MCA, 2010):  
 
Resolution 3: In line with the promotion of good governance and greater 
transparency, the Congress urges the Government to practice an open tender system 
in government procurement to achieve a level playing field in the local business 
environment, and the gradual removal of 30% Bumiputera equity in all sectors of the 
economy.  
 
Resolution 4: The Congress urges the Government to practice inclusive policies by 
liberalizing the GLCs to include more multi-ethnic Boards of Directors and workforce 
within the GLC eco-system, and to award contracts to the best qualified local 
companies in their tender, regardless of their equity composition.  
 
These resolutions increased the pressure on the government and threatened 
Bumiputera interests. However, despite resistance from the National Economic Advisory 
Council  and the MCA, the government’s commitment towards the Bumiputera continued as 
the second part of NEM was amended to include measures relevant to the Bumiputera, 
including continuing specific programs for Bumiputera small and medium enterprises and 
retaining Bumiputera corporate equity ownership target of 30%. Table 1 summarizes 
government efforts to further Bumiputera interests and increase wealth in general but more 
specifically to increase Malay ownership and representation on corporate boards. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4.3.3 Governance in post Asian crisis period 
The Asian financial crisis brought international criticisms regarding corporate failures and 
weak governance systems (Calomiris, 1998). In March 1998, the government announced plans 
for establishing the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance and the High-Level Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance. This coordinated effort between the government and 
the private sector sought to establish a framework for corporate governance and set industry 
best practices.27 In March 1999 the Committee published its report covering three broad 
                                                          
27 The High Level Finance Committee is chaired by the Secretary General of Treasury (Ministry of Finance); members 
are Malaysian Securities Commission (SC), Financial Reporting Foundation, Malaysian Accounting Standards Board, 
Companies Commission of Malaysia, the then Bursa Malaysia, Malaysian Institute of Chartered Secretaries and 
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areas: amending relevant laws; introducing mandatory training for directors; and developing 
the MCCG 2000.  
 Modelled on UK corporate governance, the Code marks a significant milestone in 
governance reform in Malaysia. It sets out principles and best practices on the structures and 
processes which companies may use to achieve an optimal governance framework. It contains 
guidelines on board composition, procedures for recruiting new directors, remuneration of 
directors, and the use of board committees. The Code also recommends that boards should 
include both executive directors and non-executive directors (including independent non-
executives) so that no individual or small group can dominate board decision-making. Also, 
there should be a formal and transparent procedure for appointing new directors to the 
board.28  
 In 2007 the Code was revised to strengthen the roles and responsibilities of the board 
of directors, the audit committee, and the internal audit function. The revised Code details 
the audit committee’s composition, frequency of meeting, and need to update its knowledge. 
All public listed companies must conduct their own internal audit. The Revised MCCG 2007 
also spells out the eligibility criteria for appointing directors. In 2010 the International 
Corporate Governance Consultative Committee was formed to provide strategic direction, 
views, and advice to the Securities Commission in developing a new five-year blueprint that 
outlined an action plan to further raise the standards of governance in Malaysia. This led to 
the issuance of a Corporate Governance Blueprint in 2011 which outlines strategic initiatives 
for strengthening self and market discipline and emphasizes promoting and internalizing the 
culture of good governance.  
The MCCG was thus further revised in 2012 to strengthen board structure and 
composition. It noted that directors must be effective stewards and guardians of the 
company, not just in setting strategic directions and overseeing business operations but also 
in ensuring company conduct complies with laws and ethical values. Directors are also 
expected to maintain an effective governance structure to ensure the appropriate 
management of risks and level of internal controls. The Code was revised again in 2017 to 
strengthen corporate culture anchored on accountability and transparency. It introduced the 
“Comprehend, Apply and Report (CARE)” approach which requires companies to “apply or 
explain an alternative” practice and marks a shift from the prevalent “comply or explain” 
approach.  International Integrated Reporting Council welcomed the revised Code, especially 
the move to introduce integrated reporting in Malaysia. Figure 4 summarizes this 
development. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
                                                          
Administrator, Malaysian Central Bank, Association of Banks Malaysia, Association of Stock-broking Companies 
Malaysia, and Federation of Public Listed Companies. 
28 Part 2 of the MCCG 2000 sets out best practices for companies, including separating the role of the board chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and ensuring Independent Non-Executive Directors form at least one-third of the 
board. Where the roles of the board chairman and CEO are combined, the board should have a strong independent 
element. A decision to combine the roles of Chairman and CEO should be publicly explained. 
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 Notwithstanding the adoption of corporate governance codes, Bumiputera institution 
continues to affect governance practices. As discussed under Phase 2, Bumiputera institution 
led to the emergence of GLC. The state’s involvement in the economy through GLCs has, in 
turn, shaped governance practices: in GLCs the Malaysian Government has a direct controlling 
stake and thus affects major decisions including the appointment of board members and 
senior management. As GLCs and GLICs are mechanisms for pursuing Bumiputera interests, 
their boards and CEO positions are dominated by Bumiputera. The GLC Transformation 
Program states in its Green Book29: 
 
In expanding the pool of potential directors, GLC Boards should look to those 
individuals who understand, and are sensitive to, the national development objectives 
of the GLC Transformation Program, the National Mission and Vision 2020. (PCG, 2006, 
p.11). 
 
Unlike non-GLCs, which mainly pursue economic interests, GLCs have social obligations 
that require boards to balance and manage sometimes opposing interests of various 
stakeholders. Therefore, GLC decisions are not always predicated on economic rationales but 
serve other purpose and interests, including fulfilling social obligations towards Bumiputera 
and the public in general: 
 
“GLCs often have to carry social obligations such as providing universal access to basic 
services or develop a local and Bumiputera supplier base, even though it is 
uneconomical, or less than economical, for the GLC to do so. The Board should be 
engaged on the economic impact of these social obligations – including the benefits 
that the GLC derives (such as monopoly rights) and the actual costs associated with 
delivering the service.” (PCG, 2006, p. 22). 
 
For non-GLCs, Bumiputera policy means that appointing Malay directors is sometimes 
a legal imperative. For instance, to apply for Bumiputera status30, operate in the oil and gas 
industry, or to obtain a licence from Malaysia’s national petroleum company - PETRONAS31, 
companies must ensure that Bumiputera always have a majority share of equity ownership, 
representation on board of directors and other key positions. Apart from this, there is no 
specific requirement to enforce Bumiputera representation on corporate boards of directors.  
 
                                                          
29 The initiatives for GLC transformation are identified and organized into ‘Execution Books’. Green Book is one of these; 
it contains the initiatives for enhancing board effectiveness.  
30 Bumiputera status is needed to obtain certain government projects or operate in the industries reserved for 
Bumiputera. 
31 Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS) is Malaysia’s fully integrated oil and gas multinational corporation. An entity 
wishes to provide goods or services to the upstream sector in the oil and gas industry in Malaysia (which involves 
exploration, development and production of oil and gas) must have a valid licence issued by PETRONAS. Issuance of 
PETRONAS Licence is based on the Petroleum Development Act and Petroleum Regulations 1974 (PETRONAS, 2014).  
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4.3.4 Impact on Bumiputera equity ownership and board representation 
Figure 2 shows that immediately following the Asian economic crisis, equity ownership of 
both the Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera declined. From 2000, the non-Bumiputera 
ownership steadily declined while the Bumiputera share remained constant at 18.9% until 
2004 before rising slightly in 2008. In 2010, Bumiputera equity ownership stood at 23.09% 
(worth RM167.7 billion) compared with 21% (worth RM127.08 billion) in 2008 (Bernama, 
2012). A year later, in 2011, it increased slightly to 23.5% (worth RM211.5 billion) – the highest 
level of Bumiputera equity recorded since the NEP was established, while non-Bumiputera 
ownership dropped further to 34.6% (worth RM311.6 billion) (Jalil, 2015). Also, Figures 3b 
and 3c show Bumiputera continue to have a significant presence on corporate boards, at least 
in the top 100 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.  
More significant is the strong position and performance of GLCs. In 2005, the 
government launched the GLC Transformation Program 2005–2015. Its 2015 ‘graduation’ 
report (PCG, 2015) shows the market capitalization of the top 20 GLCs grew almost three 
times to RM386 billion from May 14, 2004 to July 28, 2015 (the last day of the Program), 
reaching an all-time high of RM431 billion on April 7, 2015. Total shareholder returns grew 
11.1% per annum over the same period. They also made RM153.9 billion worth of domestic 
investments during 2004-2014 and in 2014 had 225,050 Malay employees. In addition, they 
contributed RM108.3 billion in dividends and RM63.5 billion in taxes during 2001-2014. While 
GLCs are promoting growth with inclusivity, 79% of the workforce in the top 20 GLCs in 2014 
was Bumiputera. The government also developed Bumiputera Empowerment Agenda to 
increase commitment of GLCs and GLICs to the Bumiputera agenda (ibid). 
 Our analysis focused on critical junctures reveals that Bumiputera has been gradually 
and subtly developed, institutionalized, and reproduced despite crises, struggles, and 
counterfactuals. Phase 3 shows the institutional significance of Bumiputera in terms of its 
path-dependence roots. Indeed, these path-dependence roots were gradually and subtly 
institutionalized in relation to counterfactuals and contingences. Critical junctures thus 
represent this entire process, which is temporal, fragile, and politically and ideologically 
discursive. We find that Bumiputera is a reproductive phenomenon and corporate governance 
is a representation and manifestation of how corporate ownership and board structures are 
institutionally reproduced rather than a mere response to globalized and isomorphic 
governance rationales.  
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
5.1  Politics, critical junctures, and governance  
This paper traced the trajectory of Bumiputera affirmative policy that shaped board 
representation and ownership structures in Malaysia using historical institutionalism as a 
lens. In this regard, we explored three interrelated questions: (1) what critical junctures 
shaped postcolonial ethnic-politics and in turn affected equity ownership representation on 
corporate boards of directors? (2) how did these critical junctures become path-dependent 
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in reproducing ownership and board structures? (3) what counterfactuals and contingencies 
were present in relation to these changes?  
We examined the role of a series of critical junctures, i.e. (i) the rejection of British 
administrators’ proposals for a Union policy; (ii) independence in 1957; (iii) the ethnic clash 
of 1969; (iv) the 1997/1998 Asian economic crisis and its implication for post-crisis policies; 
and (v) the 2010 NEM which affected Bumiputera interest and governance reform, in 
particular, ownership and board structures. These events also manifested as critical junctures 
with enough contingencies and counterfactuals reinforcing Bumiputera as a significant path 
dependent institution. Bumiputera also manifested as a political agenda that challenged 
colonial rule and values which undermined native Malays’ place in the economy and in 
society. The Malays perceived they had an ‘unfair’ social status, especially because due to the 
colonial polity, non-Malays dominated corporate boards and equity ownership. The series of 
critical junctures that gradually and subtly helped establish the Bumiputera as an alternative 
affirmative policy challenged the colonial polity, although power and politics played a crucial 
role in the transformation. This institutional change questioned the ‘taken-for-granted’ 
version of colonial polity and ushered in governance reform affecting corporate ownership 
and representation on boards of directors in Malaysia. This insight is an important 
contribution to embryonic, critical research on governance especially in emerging countries 
(see  Uddin & Choudhury, 2008; Bédard & Gendron, 2010; Yonekura et al., 2012; Siddiqui & 
Uddin, 2016; Hopper et al., 2017).   
 
5.2 Ethnicity as a vehicle for temporal processes in governance 
An important question scholars in critical junctures have addressed concerns the ‘change-
permitting’ character in historical processes of gradual and subtle transformation. Our 
historical analysis of corporate governance reform in Malaysia suggests that ethnicity allowed 
willful actors to organize themselves and argue for a change in colonial polity that 
undermined native Malays and their Sultan-based governing traditions. The willful actors had 
an ideological basis to act on and convince others of their political project. It became a 
profoundly sustainable political project because actors were ideologically convinced and the 
underlying ideology was strategically mobilized. The basis is the ethnic element – the change-
permitting character – that characterizes an endogenous force for gradual transformation 
rather than an exogenous force prompting dramatic change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).  
 That said, in the reform of corporate governance in Malaysia, ethnicity acted as an 
endogenous force as opposed to an exogenous shift that the colonial rulers imposed on the 
economy and society. Our analysis reveals that grievances, which were salient as Malays were 
socially, politically, and economically disadvantaged, stimulated a ‘change-permitting’ 
property and developed a path-dependent process that affected ownership and board 
structures. This was possible because the grievances were ideologically rooted in ethnicity 
and the resultant repercussions created a discursive space for governance reform. Such a 
possibility is not new in historical institutional analysis. When exploring how institutional 
change can occur, some scholars have examined how actors affect power balances by 
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engaging in multiple institutions (see Knight, 1992; Thelen, 1999). In our case, political and 
economic institutions shaped Bumiputera engagement in ethnic and cultural institutions. The 
Malays’ grievances played a socio-political role in organizing this multiple engagement, hence 
the influence of critical junctures.  
These contextual ramifications also show how power mechanisms work. Before 
independence, Chinese-Malays were gradually acquiring economic power while creating a 
form of competition for postcolonial economic prosperity. Our analysis suggests that critical 
junctures are inherently competitive in that one group of actors become powerful by 
mobilizing their institutional preferences, but this involves arguments and debates with 
competing groups of actors. This competition was historically significant and affected the 
series of critical junctures (discussed in Section 4). The Chinese were economically privileged 
while Malays were under-privileged and had less economic and political power. 
Consequently, willful actors (i.e. Malays) became much more cautious and competition 
between the two ethnic groups became institutionalized. As Schickler (2001) and Palier (2005) 
observed, institutions are fraught with tensions because they are confronted with resource 
considerations and distributional consequences. Compromises are thus difficult, but ethnicity 
was a powerful guiding rule for dominant actors facing ambiguities (Moe, 2005). Hence, for 
critical junctures to challenge prevailing institutions and to offer alternatives, conflicts and 
contradictions are important institutional conditions.  
Above all, the Malays desired to become dominant and powerful. Although desire is a 
psychological property that can organize an institutional preference, it is also a defining 
principle for forming the subjectivity that leads to an endogenous force against exogenous 
forces (Slater, 2010). This desire served as a ‘change-permitting’ property in all the critical 
junctures we analyzed in Section 4. As the analysis suggests, such a desire has been a defining 
principle for all temporal processes of critical junctures and affected governance reforms 
considerably by giving the Bumiputera power in the form of a larger share of corporate equity 
ownership and representation on corporate boards of directors. Hence, ethnic politics has 
been an inevitable, endogenous force affecting governance reforms in Malaysia (c.f. Davie, 
2005; Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005; Efferin & Hopper, 2007; Kim, 2008).  
 
5.3 Final remarks  
To conclude, this paper has explored a gradual and subtle institutional change in how 
governance structures were defined, maintained, and institutionalized in Malaysia. A series 
of critical junctures allowed us to unpack this trajectory of development. Our analysis shows 
that corporate governance practices in postcolonial settings such as Malaysia cannot simply 
be analyzed via historical institutions’ broader structural categories. Instead, power and 
related subjective mechanisms, which enabled willful actors to mobilize, are important in 
understanding why particular governance structures and practices materialize, are sustained, 
and debated. Drawing on historical institutionalism and critical junctures, we contribute to 
the accounting literature on governance. As discussed earlier, mainstream research places 
emphasis on testing the statistical significance of relationships between governance 
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attributes and indicators of reporting and auditing quality. Complementing such research, our 
analysis highlights willful actors’ roles in mobilizing their ethnic and political positions to affect 
reforms and governance structures. In examining how governance attributes, such as 
ownership and board structures, are debated and institutionalized, we find they are not 
merely variables in a positivistic sense but also mechanisms through which we can understand 
how ethnicity contributes to gradual and subtle transformations of institutions. Our analysis 
reveals more about the evolution of governance. While positivist research often presumes 
that such codes are responses to secure shareholder confidence in capital markets, our 
analysis shows de-coupling shareholder perspectives from actual practices can happen 
according to the specific power issue at play (c.f. Tremblay & Gendron, 2011).  We do not 
deny the influence of capital markets but deem an exclusive focus on market explanations 
incomplete and providing only a partial understanding of governance reforms and the 
emergence of governance structures.  
 Although our paper provides a contextual historical understanding of governance 
reform, in particular of corporate ownership and board representation, it lacks detailed 
accounts of actors’ views to triangulate (Modell, 2009) the textual materials into a meaningful 
case study. Nevertheless, our paper does offer a point of departure for such case-based 
research which can explore issues about how actors interact in diverse historic-institutional 
contexts and challenge prevailing governance ideas. Moreover, current variations of 
institutional theory, including institutional logics, institutional work, and institutional rhetoric, 
can be triangulated with critical junctures to address incremental change in governance 
practices to explore governance reforms and practices, including the promotion and use of 
affirmative policies and quotas. Such theoretical ideas may capture the emerging calls for 
critical accounting on issues of accounting, race and ethnicity which reflect the impacts of 
neoliberalism, financialization and globalization (Lehman, Annisette, & Agyemang, 2016; 
Annisette & Prasad, 2017; Chiapello, 2017;  Hopper et al, 2017). More detailed, case-based 
analyses can be a meaningful epistemological strategy for future research to “better narrate, 
unveil and undo the contemporary enactment” (Annisette & Prasad, 2017, p. 16) of 
ideological ramifications of temporal processes and the roles of willful actors in the 
construction of accounting and governance.         
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Bumiputera – Critical Junctures, Policy Developments, and CG Impact 
 
Notes: CG = Corporate governance; FIC= Foreign Investment Committee; GLC= Government-Linked Companies; SC= Securities 
Commission; SOE= State owned enterprise 
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Figure 2:  Equity ownership in Malaysian companies (1969–2011) 
Sources: 
Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975 (EPU, 1971, p. 40) 
Third Malaysian Plan, 1976-1980 (EPU, 1976, p. 184) 
Fourth Malaysian Plan, 1981-1985 (EPU, 1981, p. 61) 
Sixth Malaysian Plan, 1990-1995 (EPU, 1990, p. 13) 
Seventh Malaysian Plan, 1996-2000 (EPU, 1996, p.86) 
Ninth Malaysian Plan, 2006-2010 (EPU, 2006, p. 356-57) 
Tenth Malaysian Plan, 2011-2015 (EPU, 2011, p. 148) 
Prime Minister’s speech on the Eleventh Malaysia Plan, 2016-2020 (EPU, 2015, p. 7) 
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Figure 3a: Bumiputera representation on boards of directors in Kuala Lumpur Stock  
Exchange (now Bursa Malaysia) (1974) 
 
Source: Data from Lim (1981) “Ownership and control of the one hundred largest corporations 
in Malaysia” 
  
Bumiputera
11.74%
Chinese
19.00%
Indian and others 
1.90%
Foreigners
67.36%
Board representation by ethnicity - Phase 1
(1974)
 V-2017-11-23 CG BUMI Page 36 of 40 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3b: Bumiputera representation on boards of directors of Top 100 Companies in Bursa 
Malaysia (2010) 
 
Source: Data extracted from the annual reports of Top 100 companies listed on the FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (FBM KLCI) 2010. 
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 Figure 3c: Bumiputera representation on boards of directors of Top 100 Companies 
in Bursa Malaysia (2017) 
 
Source: Data extracted from the annual reports of Top 100 companies listed on the FBM KLCI 
2017. 
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Table 1: Mechanisms to Pursue Bumiputera Interest Following the NEM 2010 
Date (Effort) Notes 
10 June 2010 
(Set up the Bumiputera 
Agenda Action Council 
or MTAB) 
- To set policies and strategic direction as well as review 
the progress and delivery of various programs and 
initiatives pursuant to the Bumiputera Development 
Agenda. (www.teraju.gov.my) 
- In 2013, it was renamed the Bumiputera Economic 
Council. 
 
1 February 2011 
(Established the 
Bumiputera Agenda 
Steering Unit or Teraju) 
 
- A unit in the Prime Minister’s Department reporting 
directly to the Prime Minister and MTAB. 
- Objective is to spearhead, coordinate, and drive 
Bumiputera transformation and participation in the 
economy and to reduce the economic gaps between 
Bumiputera and other races. 
 
27 August 2011 
(Establishment of RM2 
billion Facilitation Fund) 
- Resulting from the joint efforts of TERAJU and the 
Public Private Partnership Unit to provide support for 
Private Funded Initiatives of the Bumiputera. 
- For eligible Bumiputera companies to carry out big 
projects with minimum qualifying value of RM20 
million. 
 
20 July 2011 
(Launched High 
Performance 
Bumiputera Companies 
or Teras) 
- The goal is to have vibrant participation of Bumiputera 
SMEs in the National Key Economic Areas sectors and 
for Bumiputera SMEs to make a significant contribution 
to the national Gross Domestic Product. 
- Will get access to new business opportunities, 
financing, business consultations 
- Criteria includes Bumiputera equity of 60%-100%; 
CEO/Managing Director must be Bumiputera; majority 
of management teams are Bumiputera; must not be a 
subsidiary of a GLC/Multi National Company 
(www.teraju.gov.my) 
- Selected 30 companies; target to have 100 companies 
in 3 months. 
- Priority for bidding contracts. 
 
26 November 2011 - Encompass policies and strategies to correct the 
current imbalance in income and wealth distribution. 
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(Launched Bumiputera 
Economic 
Transformation 
Roadmap) 
- Three strategic foci: reform of policy instruments and 
rationalization of delivery system; strengthening 
education and building capabilities; and acquiring, 
creating or developing businesses with sufficient scale. 
- To enhance the value of Bumiputera-owned assets such 
as unit trusts, “zakat” funds and “waqaf” land via 
pooling them. 
- Management of the assets by government institutions. 
 
14 September 2013 
(Launched the 
Bumiputera Economic 
Empowerment Council) 
- This refers to Bumiputera economic empowerment 
programs focusing on five areas, one of which is to 
strengthen the Bumiputera equity ownership in the 
corporate sector. 
 
 
21 May 2015 
(Released 11th Malaysian 
Plan 2016-2020) 
 
- The government will undertake a five-pronged 
approach to enhance Bumiputera Economic 
Community to enhance wealth ownership under the 
Plan. 
- The government set up a target to reach 30% 
Bumiputera equity by the year 2020. RM47.95 billion 
have been allocated for programs towards growing 
Bumiputera SMEs, to be implemented by the TERAJU. 
  
 
 
 
